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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION,

)

Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs-

l
l
l

I
l

)
)
)

STERLING A. MEYER and JEANNE
D. MEYER et ux., REECE HOWELL,
Escrow Agent, and TITLE
INSURANCE AGENCY,

Case No. 14833

-

l

)

Defendants and Respondents.

l

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal by the Plaintiff, Boise Cascade Corporation, from
a Judgment entered on the 20th day of October, 1976, by the Honorable Marcellus
K. Snow, Judge of the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant's Motion for

Sum~ary

Judgment dismissing Plaintiff's action

was granted and an order to that effect was entered by the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County on October 20, 1976.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Summary Judgment grante d ·1n favor
of the Defendants and for a Judgment in its favor as a matter of law, on the
ground that the Utah statutory dower provision, Section 74-4-3 Utah Code Annotated (1953), is unconstitutional on its face or as applied. Defendants and
Respondents seek to have the Order of the Third Judicial District Court, discussed herein, upheld in its entirety.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant Ls Statement of th.e Facts set forth in its Brief is correct
and is not disputed by Respondent.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED AMD APPLIED SECTION
74-4-3, UTAH CODE AtlNOTATED, WHICH CREATES AN INTEREST FOR A WIFE IN THE
HUSBAND'S REAL PROPERTY.
A wife's right in real estate possessed by her husband, is set forth
in Utah Code Annotated, Section 74-4-3, as amended in 1953.

This provision of

the Code provides as follows:
"WIFE'S INTEREST IN HUSBAND'S REAL PROPERTY.
One-third in value of all of the legal or equitable estates
in real property possessed by the husband at any time during
the marriage, to which the wife has made no relinquishment
of her rights, shall be set apart as her property in fee simple,
if she survives him; provided, that the wife shall not be
entitled to any interest under the provisions of this Section
in any such estate of which the husband has maJe a conveyance
when the wife, at the time of the conveyance, was not and never
had been a resident of the territory or state of Utah. Property
distributed under the provisions of this Section shall be free
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from all debts of the decedent except those secured by liens for
or labor done or material furnished exclusively for the
improvement of the same, and except those created for the purchase
thereof, and for taxes levied thereon. The value of such part
of the homestead as may be set aside to the widow shall be
deducted from the distributive share provided for her in this
Section. In cases wherein only the heirs, devisees and legatees
of the decedent are interested, the property secured to the
widow by this Section may be set off by the Court in due process
of administration."

~ork

This statute clearly establishes a real property interest in wives
who qualify under the Statute.

This statute is couched in unambiguous language

and clearly sets forth the requirements which must be met before a wife can
participate in the rights described in this statute.

This statute sets up the

equivalent of a Dower right for wives in the State of Utah.
There are several Utah cases which discuss the rights of a married
woman in and to real estate possessed by her husband.

The landmark case in

Utah in connection with a woman's dower rights is the case of Hilton v. Thatcher
~·,

31 Utah 360, 88 Pac. 20 (1906).

The facts in the Hilton case are

essentially the same as the facts in the present case.

In ~a widow who

had not released or joined in her husband's conveyance of some real property
possessed by him, sought a court determination of her rights to share in this
real property.

The Court held that a wife, unless she releases her right

thereto, must be provided with one third of the land of which her husband
1·1as seized at any time during the marriage.

The Court concluded that the

existence of this property right in a wife is entirely within the control
of the Legislature.
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The Hilton, supra, case is interesting in that it provides an excellent historical analysis of a woman's rights to real property in the State
of Utah.

As the Court in Hilton points out, the common law dov1er right was

abrogated in the State of Utah when the Congress of the United States enacted
a law in 1887, providing that:
"A widow shall be endowed of a third part of all the lands
whereof her husband was seized of an estate of inheritance
at any time during the marriage unless she shall have lawfully
released her right thereto." {P. 2)
(Comp. Laws Utah 1888, 1919).
In 1898 when Utah entered into the Un ion as a State, LAWS OF UTAH
were enacted which gave essentially the same rights to a widow.

Section 2826

of the Revised Statutes of Utah provided as follows:
"One third in value of all the legal or equitable estates in
real property possessed by the husband at any time during
marriage, and to which the wife had made no relinquishment
of her rights, shall be set apart as her property in fee simple,
if she survive him."
The modern-day equivalent of this statute is Section 74-11-3 of the
Utah Code Annotated, referred to earlier in this Brief.

This brief historical

analysis makes it clear that the long-standing intent of the lawmakers in the
State of Utah has been to provide a wife with real property rights in her
husband's estate.
Thus, a wid01·1's right to an interest in the lands of her husband
has been continuous from 1887 to the present time in the State of Utah.

The

long history of this law makes it obvious that the citizens of the State of
Utah are cognizant of this Jaw, recognize the ir:iportance of it and, further,
that Utahns take this Jaw into account when they plan their 1 ives.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Another Utah case, Hatch v. Hatch, 148 Pac. 1096 (1915), also
discussed the equitable rights of a married woman in her husband's real property.
In this case the administrator of a wife's estate sued to recover from the
executor of her husband's property, alleged to have been the wife's separate
estate, that share which should have been the wife's.

The Utah Supreme Court

in this case also discussed the historical development of a woman's real property
rights in the State of Utah.

A reading of this case is helpful in understanding

the equitable approach toward women and their property rights in the State of
Utah.

The Court in Hatch v. Hatch, supra, refers to the case of Hilton v.

Thatcher, discussed herein, and makes the following observation in connection
with the dower law in Utah:
"The people of the territory (Utah) tacitly agreed upon
maxims and principles of the common law suited to their
condition and consistent with the constitution and laws of
the United States. 11 (P. 1099)
Clearly, one of the principles of the common Jaw which the Legislature of the
State of Utah has deemed to be suited to the conditions and needs of the State
of Utah, and consistent with the Constitution is Section 74-4-3 of the Utah
Code Annotated (1953).

Section 74-4-3,earlier cited, is the modern day equiva-

Jent and outgrowth of the common Jaw principle which the Legislature for the
State of Utah adopted early in the State's history and has consistently included
in Utah law ever since that time.
The Court in Hatch v. Hatch, supra, points out that under the old
English Common Law and the early Roman Law, the r.iarital power of the husband
was absolute, and the 1vife had no legal existence apart from that of her
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husband.

Under these legal systems a wife could neither acquire nor hold

property and was incapable of doing anything as a "ferrw sole".

The husband,

at the time of the marriage, became the possessor of tire wife's property and
had the right to sell said property without her consent.

In return, he was

made liable for her debts, torts, misdemeanors, and some crimes.

These ardiaic

legal systems have long since been specifically abolished, and in their stead
a concept of the husband and wife as "partners" has developed.

This is the at·

titude which is reflected by the Utah Code Annotated, Section 74-4-3.
The Utah State Supreme Court in Hatch v. Hatch, dee ided in I 915 that
the "dower" right was vital for the equitable treatment of women.
In the case before the Court, Jeanne D. Meyer meets the requirements
of Sect ion 74-4-3 of the Utah Code Annotated for pa rt i c i pat ion in the "dower"
rights discussed herein.

Jeanne D. Meyer made no relinquishment of her rights

in this property, she was married to Ster! ing A. Meyer at the time the propercy
was acquired and possessed by him and she is now and has been a resident of
Utah for many years.
Further, the property which is the subject of this action, is not
subject to any materialman's I ien.
Finally, it is important to note that the Utah Statute, 74-4-3 refers
to the property in which the wife shares, as a "homestead".

The use of this word

is a clear indication of the fact that the Utah Legislature saw this property
as a "home" for a wife, and possibly for her children as we! I.

A woman's

.
.
•1n the last deca d e, b ut, 't
still
"place" in soctety
has changed radically
1 ·s
I
accurate to state that more often than not wor:ien out! ive men, and then need to

- 6 -
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make or maintain a home for themselves or themselves and their children, without;
the support of their husbands.

It is also still a fact that men still make

many or most of the business decisions for their families; business decisions
which might result in the loss of family property.
Courts have taken these facts into account in the drafting of dower
and dower-like statutes.
In the case at hand the Defendant, Sterling A. Meyer, did make some
business decisions which resulted in the incurring of debt.

The Plaintiff and

Appellant sued him on such a debt and is now seeking to enforce its judgment
against all of the real property in question.

This situation is the very situa-

tion the Utah Legislature foresaw and attempted to prevent with Section 74-4-3
of the Utah Code Annotated.

The District Court saw this and correctly inter-

preted and applied this statute in this case.
PO trlT 11

j

APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO SHO\/ THAT SECTIOtl 74-4-3 OF THE UTAH CODE ArlNOTATED
IS UNCOIJSTITUTIOll EITHER AS A DEtllAL OF EQUAL PROTECTJOtl OR AS A DEtHAL OF
DUE Pfl.O CES S.

I

..

The la1~ is 1-1ell settled that a distinction for purposes of legislative•.

l

1

classification, based on sex, does not necessarily constitute a denial of
Equal Protection where the classification bears some reasonable or rational

j

relation to the object sought to be accomplished by the Legislature.

1

This rule

was established in the case of Anderson v. St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186, 32 Northwest 2d 538.

It is a further wel I established legal conclusion that the Equal

Protection clause of the Constitution does not require absolute equality.
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This

rule is set forth in the case of Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 82 L.
Ed 252, 58 S. Ct. 205 (1937).
Breedlove v. Suttles dealt with the question of the constitutionali~
of a poll tax which applied unequally as between men and women.

The law in

question provided that in the case of women, registration for voting

11 as

per-

mitted without payment of taxes for previous years, whereas in the case of men,
registration was not permitted without the payment of taxes.

The Court in this

case held that:
"Women may be exempted (from the payment of poll taxes) on the
basis of special considerations to which they are naturally
entitled.
In view of burdens necessarily bourne by them for
the preservation of the race, the State reasonably may exempt
them from the taxes." (82 L. Ed., P. 255)
The statute in this case is similar to the statute in our case.

Both

statutes treat women and establish what are allegedly reverse discrimination
Jaws.

In Breedlove, the Supreme Court found that there was no denial of Equal

Protection and the Court stated that the Equal Protection clause of the Constitut ion does not require absolute equality.
The right to have a roof over one's head or a "homestead" seems to be
an even more vital

interest, deserving the Legislature's recognition and the

State's protection, than the right to vote.

Therefore, one can conclude that

it is uni ikely that the Supreme Court would find a denial of Equal Protection
in our situation.
Appellant cites the SuprerT1e Court case of Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 35!,
40 L. Ed. 2d 189, 94 S. Ct. 1734 (1974} as support for their position thatthe
·
·
1.
Utah dower statute is unconstttut1ona

K,..hn
v. Sh"v"1n
is improperly cited as
~
-

- 3 -
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support for this position.

In point of fact, Kahn v. Shevin supports Respondent'

contention that the statute in question 22_ constitutional.
Kahn v. Shevin, supra, involves a Florida statute which grants widows,
but not widowers, an annual $500 property tax exemption.

The statute allegedly

set up reverse discrimination, a situation not unlike the Utah Statute in
question.

In Kahn v. Shevin, the Supreme Court ruled that the statute did not

violate the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the
State's differential treatment of widows and widowers had a rational basis and
had fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.

That is

to say, that the statute accomplished the reasonable objective of cushioning
the financial impact of the loss of a spouse upon the sex for whom that loss
imposes a disproportionately heavy

burde~.

The Court in this case stated that,

"there can be no dispute that the financial difficulties confronting the lone
woman in Florida or in any other state exceed those facing the lone man,"
(90 L. Ed. 2d at p. 192).

The Supreme Court in this case referred to the

"disparity between the economic capabilities of a man and a woman".

This same

disparity exists in Utah and forms part of the rational basis for Section
74-4-3, Utah Code Annotated.

Also, a desire by the Utah Legislature to alleviate

economic hardship for widows in Utah was the object of enacting this statute.
In support of this statement regarding economic ability, data supplied
by the U.

s.

Department of Labor, showing the median earnings for men and women

for the years from 1955 to 1972 was set out in the Supreme Court's decision in
Kahn.

The tables of data are set forth herein, since they are clearly relevant

- 9 -
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to the Utah statute, and they lend support for Respondents'

content ion that ther,,

is a rational basis for the differential treatment of wido 115 and widowers in
connect ion with real property interests in the State of Utah.
"The Women's Bureau provides the fol lowing data:

Year
1972
1971
1970
1969
1963
1967
1966
I 965
1964
1963
1962
1961
1960
1959
1958
I 957
1956
1955

Median earn i n~s
Women
Men
$5,903
5,593
5,323
4,977
4,457
4,150
3,973
3,823
3,690
3,561
3,446
3,351
3,293
3, 193
3,102
3,008
2,827
2,719

$10,202
9,399
8,966
8,227
7,664
7' 182
6,848
6,375
6, 195
5,978
5,794
5,664
5,417
5,209
4,927
4,713
4,466
4,252

\/omen's median
earnings as
percent of men's
57.9
59.5
59.4
60.5
58.2
57.S
58.0
60.0
59.6
59.6
59.4
59.4
60.8
61. 3
63.0
63.8
63.3
63.9

Note.--Data for 1962-72 are not strictly comparable with
those for prior years, which are for wages and salary income
only and do not include earnings of self-employed persons.
Source: Table prepared by Homen's Bureau, Employment
Standards Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, from
data published by Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of
Commerce." (As set out in Kahn v. Shevin, 40 L. Ed., at P. 192)
In Appellant's Brief the case of Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484,
41 L Ed. 2d 256, 94 S. Ct. 21158 (1974), is also cited in support of their positic
This case, like the Kahn v. Shevin case, is improperly cited as being surportive
of Appellant's position.

The Court in Geduldig v. Aiello upheld the consti-

tutionality of a pregnancy exclusion from coverage under the California disabilic
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
l 0Utah- State Library.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered-by the
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insurance system that pays benefits to those privately employed who are temporarily unable to work because of disability not covered by workmen's compensation.

The Supreme Court held that the coverage exclusion did not amount to an

invidious discrimination under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The Supreme Court in both the Kahn and~ cases held that there
was no denial of Equal Protection and, thus, no discrimination where a statute
which differentially treated the sexes could be supported by a rational basis
test.

The rule is that if a State Legislature has a valid, rational objective

in mind when a statute is drafted and if the statute, in fact, effects this
reasonable objective, the Supreme Court will uphold the statute.

In our case

it appears clear from the Utah case law that an attitude exists in the State
of Utah which was acknowledged by the State Legislature in drafting the Utah
dower statute.

This statute takes into account the sociological conditions in

the State of Utah.

The conditions are such that women, despite great advances

made in the area of equal pay, etc., are still in an inferior economic position,
and therefore in greater need of certain protections.
the logical analysis of the Supreme Court.

Utah Courts must follow

As the Supreme Court noted, in the

case of Quang Wing v. Kirkendahl, 223 U.S. 59, 56 L. Ed. 350, 32 S. Ct. 192
(1912), a case dealing with a Montana statute which differentially imposed a
certain 1 icense tax on men and women in the laundry business:
''If Montana deemed it advisable to put a 1 ighter burden upon
women than upon men with regard to employment .•• the Fourteenth
Amendment does not interfere by creating a fictitious equality
where there is a real difference." (56 L. Ed., at P. 352)

- 11 -
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lt is Respondents

1

pas it ion that in the State of Utah there is a

real difference between men and women in their ability to acquire and hold
property.

This attitude, which has been acknowledged by the Legislature in

drafting Section 74-4-3 of Utah Code Annotated, is not based on any fictitious
stereotype of woman as a weaker member of the species, but rather upon a
realistic appraisal of the present economic conditions faced by the two
sexes in the State of Utah.

In the case at hand we have a clear example of

the very situation the Legislature had in mind when this statute was drafted.
The statute was drafted to protect

wo~en

from, among other things, those

debts of their spouses which they had had no part in creating, which operated
to deprive them, and possibly their children, of important, vital rights in
property.
Appellant's contention that Section 74-4-3 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953), is unconstitutional as a denial of Due Process is very weak.
Most of the case law cited by Appellant is in support of the denial of
Equal Protection assertion.
The Utah case of Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S.
44,

96

S. Ct. 249, 46 L. Ed. 2d 181 (1975), is cited in support of Appellant's

claim that the Utah Statute constitutes a denial of Due Process.
This case involved a Utah statute which made pregnant women ineligible
for unemployment benefits for a period of t1·1elve weeks before expected
childbirth up tflrough six weeks after childbirth.

The Utah Supreme Court

held that the statute violated no constitutional guarantee.

The United States

Supreme Court held that the statute violated the Due Process clause of the Four·
teenth Amendment.

It is clear that the facts in this case are easily
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distinguishable from the facts in our case.

The~. supra, statute

deprived the Appellant of a "basic human liberty".

There is no deprivation

or "taking" of any basic right in the case before the Court.

On the contrary,

Respondents are seeking to have a right, created by statute, enforced as to
a woman who qua! ifies for said right.
Appellants have failed to prove that either a denial of Equal Protection or of Due Process exists in the suit before the Court.
The Legislatures and Courts of this Country have been quite
insistant in correcting inequalities in our society.

There are many "Affirm-

ative Action Prograris" adopted by the Courts and the Leg is I atures to improve
the lot of disadvantaged persons.

Examples of these are many fold including

the school busing program, veteran's program, minority training employment
program, etc.

Consent to Court decrees in cases such as the American Telephone

and Telegraph case, Bank of America case, etc. requires special action and
expenditures to improve the portion of the lot of women and minorities
and require artificial stimulas to employnent and payment practices to assist
these disadvantaged groups.

From the history of the statutory dower section,

it is obvious that the Courts and Legislatures considered women, as they
related to landholdings, to be a disadvantaged group; and the Utah laws
recognizing do11er rights in women in creating the statutory dower are historical atte1""1ps to recognize the difference between the sexes and create
affirmative act ion programs to protect these people.

It would seem ridic-

ulous to strike do11n a proven and effective affirmative action program with
historical roots on one hand, while Courts and Legislatures are insisting
that the citizenry adopt and enforce similar programs.
- 13 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POI NT 111
SECTION 74-4-3 OF THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED IS CONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED
TO THE CASE AT HAND.
Appellants assert, that Section 74-4-3 of the Utah Code Annotated,
as amended in 1953, is unconstitutional as applied to Respondents.

It is

Appellant's contention that Jeanne D. Heyer sold her dower right, and by so
doing relinquished any and all rights she had to the property in question.
Appel I ant further contends that since Respondent, Sterling A. Meyer, is still
alive Jeanne D. Meyer is precluded from taking her dower right.
Section 74-4-3 of the Utah Code Annotated, provides that a
wife must meet certain qualifications before she can claim her dOl"er interest
which were disucussed herein in Point

of Respondents' Brief.

Si nee her

husband acquired the real estate during coveture and Jeanne D. Heyer has not
released her rights therein she met all of the requirements under the
statute necessary to claim her legal interest in the real estate.

Jeanne D.

Meyer, along with her husband, Sterling A. Meyer, contracted to sell
the subject property to a third party.
a relinquishment of her d01·1er rights.

Appellant contends that this is
Since Jeanne Meyer is to be paid for

her dower right, pursuant to the above described sale, there can be 1 ittle
doubt that sh.e is relinquishing her dower right as to purchaser.

Further,

in being compensated for selling the property, she is being compensated for
her dower right, and her do1-1er right is being recognized in the sale to the
third party.

The Appellant is attempting to take her dower right 1vithout

Mrs. Meyer's consent and without compensation and the Court should not condo~
such conduct.
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The case law cited by Appellant with respect to this argument does
not apply to this case.
The argument that Respondent, Jeanne D. Meyer, has no interest
since she is not a widow is ridiculous.

Respondent is not asserting that

Jeanne D. Meyer is a widow, but that she has an incohate interest in the
real property.

Although the interest does not vest until the death of the

husband, it clearly exists at this time.

Appellant cites the case of In Re

Madsen's Estate , 259 Pac. 2d 595, this case is cited for the proposition
that where a v.o~an joins in a contract for the sale of land owned by her
husband she thereby relinquishes her incohate right of dower in the real
property covered by the contract.

This Court

in~

notes that the right

of dower or its statutory equivalent has always been highly favored in the
law and the purpose of the dower statute is to assure an interest in the
property and support to the widow after the death of the husband and the
Court points out:
11
• • • the Court cannot preserve and ho Id for a widow some
thing that she has voluntarily sold or disposed of.
Dower cannot be revived at the cost of a wife's liberty
to contract. The Court cannot arbitrarily vitiate a
sale that has been voluntarily made ••• " (G03)

It is clear that the Court in Madsen, ruled as it did because
the wife was seeking to assert her dower right to invalidate a contract in
which she had intelligently and willingly entered.

This situation is

obviously different from the case before the Court where the Appellant
seeks to take Mrs. Meyer's interest without consent or compensation.
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Appellant's final contention is that the wife's dmier
interest is in the real property itself and not in the proceeds from
any sale or other disposition of the real property.
the case of In Re Park's,

Appellant cites

31 Utah 255, 87 Pac. 900 (1906).

Appellant has not understood and has improperly reported
the Park's case.

fn the Park

case, the widow had the election of claim-

int her interest in the real estate, or the proceeds thereof, or making
a claim against her husband's estate for the value that he had received.
The Court accurately stated that her interest 1vas in the land not against
her husband's estate.

The Court stated, page

903, " ... her right is

against the land against which it constitutes a vested and enforceable
interest and encumbrance in her favor."
claiming her interest in the land.

In this case, Mrs. Meyer is

She refused to release her dower

interest to the Appellant and insisted that she be paid therefor.

Mrs.

Meyer has not relinquished her interest in the real estate to the
Appellant, but has only stated that she would release her interest to a
buyer upon the payment of an amount she determined to be reasonable value
of her inchoate interest.
The only matter decided in the Park estate 1·1as that the
wife's interest was in the land and equal to "one-third of the value of
all legal or equitable estates in the real property possessed by the
husband at any tirie during the r.1arriuge" (page

902).

Mrs. Meyer had

an interest in the real estate and consented to the sale of that inchoate
interest conditioned only that she be paid therefor.

The Appellant seeks

to take her consideration which is her port ion of the real estate und, as
stated in the statute "one-third of the vci I uP".
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CONCLUS rori
The constitutionality of Section 74-11-3 of the Utah Code
Annotated seems clear after an analysis of Utah case law and the recent
Supreme Court decisions in the area of Equal Protection and Due Process.
Appellants have contended that this statute is unconstitutional as a denial
of Equal Protect ion and Due Process unsupported by any "compel Jing State
interest".

The discuss ion herein of case law, pub! ic pol icy, constitutional

authority, statutory law, etc. makes it clear that there is a compelling
State interest for the dower provision in the State of Utah.

This law

which has essentially been in effect throughout the history of Utah, is
based on a recognition by the Legislature of the existing sociological conditions in this State.

It isn't up to individuals in the State or to the

State's Court to determine what is reasonable and what laws fairly comply
with the existing sociological conditions in the State.

It is within the

preview of the State's Legislature to determine what is reasonable and what is
in the best interest of the State, as long as this is in keeping with the
Constitution.
For generations, the citizenry has accommodated its actions
to account for the protection afforded wives by the dower statutes and
no pressing need for revolution is indicated.
This action is not brought by a husband or wife claiming
unfair or unequal treatment; but by an outsider attempting to benefit at
the expense of the marital union.
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The Appeal should be dismissed thereby confirming the
wife's statutory dower interest as provided by the Statutes of the
State of Utah.
Respectfully submitted,

of and for
BIELE, HASLA11 & HATCH
80 lies t Broadway, Suite #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendants and
Respondents
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